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ABSTRACT
Centralized Prevention of Denial of Service Attacks
by
Michael R. Sthultz
Dr. Ajoy K. Datta, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Computer Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The world has come to depend on the Internet at an increasing rate for 
communication, e-commerce, and many other essential services. As such, the Internet 
has become an integral part of the workings of society at large. This has lead to an 
increased vulnerability to remotely controlled disruption of vital commercial and 
government operations -  with obvious implications. This disruption can be caused by an 
attack on one or more specific networks which will deny service to legitimate users or an 
attack on the Internet itself by creating large amounts of spurious traffic (which will deny 
services to many or all networks). Individual organizations can take steps to protect 
themselves but this does not solve the problem of an Internet wide attack. This thesis 
focuses on an analysis of the different types of Denial of Service attacks and suggests an 
approach to prevent both categories by centralized detection and limitation of excessive 
packet flows.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the Internet over the past ten years and its incorporation into 
almost all aspects of business and government has brought us to a critical point. As the 
usage of the Internet gets more widespread and as more vulnerabilities are discovered and 
exploited, the risk of a major disruption of essential services is cause for concern.
The most dangerous vulnerability is Denial of Service (DoS). This thesis discusses 
the different types of DoS with emphasis on bandwidth consumption since this is the 
most difficult for an individual organization to control and therefore has the broadest 
implications.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the different types of DoS. Chapter 3 summarizes 
some of the DoS detection and prevention proposals that have appeared in the literature. 
Chapter 4 suggests a simplified and effective approach to control all types of bandwidth 
consumption Denial of Service attacks. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a summary and 
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
TYPES OF DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
Denial of Service (DoS) can be achieved by an attack that renders a system totally 
inaccessible. It can also be realized by an attack that overloads system, network, or 
Internet resources to the extent that a legitimate user cannot easily access the system. As 
the use of the Internet has grown, the number and types of these attacks has grown with 
it. In order to better understand the different types of DoS and be able to discuss a 
mechanism that could be used to prevent it, we will categorize DoS as resource 
starvation, redirection, and bandwidth consumption. Bandwidth consumption will be 
further delineated as direct and indirect.
Resource Starvation
Resource starvation is defined as an attack on the resources of the system itself. The 
attack can cause the system to go into an infinite loop (“hang”), halt (“crash”), or just be 
kept artificially busy by an excessive use of CPU cycles.
In addition to the obvious physical intervention (e.g. power interruption), an attack 
can come from within the system (local resource starvation) through an employee, a 
contractor, identity theft, or via a compromised system. Local attacks usually involve 
process killing, a change in system configuration, filling up the process table, filling up 
the file system, or the planting of a logic bomb.
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Remote resource starvation generally exploits an Operating System specific 
vulnerability. A number of these attacks have been described in the literature and have 
even been given names:
A Land attack sends a spoofed packet in which the source and destination IP 
addresses are the same. The source and destination ports are generally the same as well. 
This can cause the TCP/IP stack to get confused and the system crashes.
A Ping of Death sends an oversized ping packet. The TCP/IP stack cannot properly 
handle it and the system crashes.
SSPing sends a series of highly fragmented, oversized ICMP packets. TCP/IP has to 
keep track of additional information to reassemble the packets and the result is a memory 
overflow. The system either hangs or crashes.
Jolt2 sends a stream of packet fragments, none of which has an offset of zero. This 
means that none of the fragments looks like the first one in the packet. TCP/IP attempts 
to reassemble these bogus fragments and this consumes all processor capacity.
Teardrop sends packet fragments in which the fragment offsets are set to incorrect 
values. The packets appear to be overlapping and do not align properly. TCP/IP 
attempts to rebuild an impossible packet and the system crashes.
Winnuke sends random data to an open file sharing port (TCP port 139). The system 
attempts to process the data that it assumes to be in Server Message Block (SMB) format. 
It cannot properly interpret the block and it crashes.
Stream/Raped sends a stream of TCP ACK packets to a series of ports. The packets 
use random sequence numbers and random source IP addresses. This consumes all 
processor capacity.
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Email Bombing sends a large number of very large emails. This disrupts the ability 
of the system to send or view email but it can also block other services.
There are many other resource starvation attacks that have been identified: CPU Hog, 
RPC Locator, Bubonic, Newtear, Bonk, Syndrop, etc. Unfortunately, there are also many 
others that will be developed.
Redirection
Redirection, as the name implies, redirects a request for serviee to a system other than 
the intended system. This can be done either by altering the routing process or by 
affecting the DNS resolution of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) to IP addresses.
Routers maintain their routing tables primarily through a dynamic process utilizing 
updates controlled by routing protocols. If these updates can be spoofed, the routing 
tables will contain incorrect information and packets will be misrouted. Another 
technique is to use source routing whereby the source system generating the packet 
specifies the route the packet will take as it traverses the network. All responses to 
source-routed packets will inverse the route of the originating packet. An intermediate 
system can thus be set up to intercept the response packets and deny service.
DNS redirection is done through DNS Cache Poisoning. A remote DNS server is 
used to put incorrect DNS records in the cache of a victim DNS server. A query to this 
server would then return an incorrect IP address for a particular FQDN. The poisoning 
could be accomplished either through a query from the remote DNS server (with an 
imbedded query response) or through a response to a query forced from the victim DNS 
server.
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Direct Bandwidth Consumption
A direct bandwidth consumption attack is directed at the bandwidth serving an 
individual system. It is possible to initiate a local form of a bandwidth consumption 
attack by generating a large amount of spurious outbound traffic but this is the exception 
to the rule. For the most part, a direct bandwidth consumption attack is initiated from one 
or more remote systems.
An attack is often initiated from more than one remote system. This is considered a 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. The attacker compromises a large number 
of systems that are referred to as “zombies”. These zombies can be located anywhere in 
the world and hundreds or even thousands of them are used in a specific attack. In the 
past, these were often systems at universities, companies or ISPs. With the growing 
popularity of “always on” systems utilizing DSL or cable-modem, these systems are 
being frequently used as zombies. The use of this technology by relatively 
unsophisticated home users makes it particularly vulnerable. In addition to zombies, 
attaekers will often use one or more compromised systems as master systems. These 
masters are used to trigger all of the zombies to simultaneously conduct a DoS attack on 
the victim system. The use of masters and zombies has the added advantage of 
distancing the attacker from the victim and making tracing of the actual source of the 
attack more difficult.
A relatively new type of DoS is a Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DRDos) 
which has been described as a next-generation DDoS attack [10]. This involves SYN 
flooding Internet routers and high bandwidth servers with TCP connection-requesting 
SYN packets to legitimate service ports. These packets are sent with a spoofed IP source
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address of the victim system. The victim system then gets flooded with the SYN/ACK 
response packets. This type of attack is particularly dangerous since it cannot be blocked 
by the victim (it uses legitimate service ports), the intermediary routers/servers have a 
high bandwidth capability, and the attack is automatically multiplied since the 
unanswered SYN/ACKS will be repeated several times.
Direct bandwidth consumption attacks can be cormection oriented (where actual TCP 
connections are established with the attacking system) but these are not commonly used 
because of the ease of identifying the source IP address and the relative ease of applying 
filtering to stop the attack. There are a number of known types of commonly used 
connectionless direct bandwidth consumption attacks;
A SYN flood can be a form of resource starvation or, if amplified through DDoS, a 
form of bandwidth consumption. In this attack, a TCP SYN packet is sent with a spoofed 
source IP address of an inactive system. The victim system sends a SYN/ACK and waits 
for an ACK response. The connection queue fills up with half open connections and no 
new connections can be initiated by legitimate users.
A Smurf attack is used with DDoS. Multiple echo request packets are sent from 
zombies. These echo request packets are sent as a directed broadcast to one or more 
intermediary networks with the source IP address spoofed as being from the victim 
system. All active systems on the intermediary network will send echo replies. The 
victim system will be overwhelmed with these echo replies and will be unable to respond 
to legitimate users.
A Fraggle attack is very similar to a Smurf attack but it uses UDP instead of ICMP. 
The zombies are directed to send UDP packets to an IP broadcast address with a
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8destination UDP port that will send a response, such as the UDP echo service (port 7). 
The victim system is then overwhelmed with the UDP responses.
There is a direct bandwidth consumption attack called Papa Smurf that is a 
combination of Smurf and Fraggle.
Echo-Chargen is an attack that sends UDP packets to the Chargen ports (port 19) of 
numerous hosts with the source IP address spoofed as being from the victim system. The 
source port is Echo (port 7). Chargen then responds with a pseudo random string of 
characters. Traffic will then reflect back and forth between the Chargen and Echo ports. 
Both bandwidth and processor capacity are affected.
Indirect Bandwidth Consumption
An indirect bandwidth consumption attack affects the bandwidth among multiple 
systems -  or even the bandwidth of the entire Internet. The primary vehicle for this type 
of attack is through a self-propagating program that is often referred to as a “worm”.
The term “worm” was first used in 1982 by Shoch and Hupp of Xerox PARC to 
describe a benign program that was designed to propagate through a local area network to 
perform system maintenance functions. The first well-known malicious worm that 
exploited security vulnerabilities in host software to infect several thousand systems was 
reported in 1988. The fast growth rate of this worm caused a noticeable disruption in 
Internet-wide communication [18].
Worms weren’t much of a problem on the Internet until July, 2001 when “CodeRed” 
was released [18]. Code-Red exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft IIS 
web server via a HTTP request [27]. The worm infected almost 360,000 systems in less
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than 14 hours with a peak infection rate of 2,000 systems per minute [18]. CodeRed had 
a limited bandwidth effect due, in part, to its being based on TCP.
Another well-known worm, Nimda, was released in September, 2001. Nimda 
infected over 2.2 million systems in a 24-hour period. This worm propagated via email 
and local network scanning for Microsoft IIS vulnerabilities (Unicode Web Traversal 
exploit). Nimda’s bandwidth DoS effect were more localized due to its method of 
propagation [28].
These propagation speeds were considered fast until January 25, 2003 when the 
Sapphire/Slammer worm was released. Slammer doubled in size every 8.5 seconds and 
infected 90 percent of vulnerable systems worldwide within 10 minutes. This worm 
propagated via UDP and exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft’s SQL 
Server or MSDE 2000 (Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine). The usage of UDP is 
significant in that the worm did not have to wait for a response (or timeout) to a TCP 
SYN packet. This means it was bandwidth-limited rather than latency-limited. It was 
able to achieve a scanning rate of over 55 million scans per second after approximately 
three minutes [19]. The effect of this was numerous network outages, which resulted in 
canceled airline flights, interference with elections, interruption of emergency services, 
and ATM failures. Fortunately Slammer did not have a malicious payload.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
DENIAL OF SERVICE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 
There are a number of steps the user can take to defend against resource starvation 
and redirection types of DoS attacks. These include maintaining operating system patch 
levels, disabling any unused or unneeded network services, enabling quota systems, 
maintaining appropriate password policies, physical security, firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, etc. [4]. Bandwidth consumption attacks are, however, out of the 
direct control of the user. There are a number of discussions in the literature regarding 
proposed mechanisms to detect and prevent bandwidth consumption DoS attacks. These 
can be categorized as either new protocols or traffic analysis.
New Protocols
The National Science Foundation has recently launched a $12 million research 
project to develop a “secure, decentralized Internet infirastructure that is resistant to 
failure and attack” [9]. The Infrastructure for Resilient Internet Systems (Iris) project 
will involve researchers at several prominent computer science laboratories including 
MIT and UC Berkeley. The project intends to use a distributed hash table technology 
that will support distributed applications on the Internet that will tolerate individual nodes 
that might be insecure or unreliable. This would only protect specific users using
10
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selected applications and would not be effective against an indirect attack. It will also be 
several years before the design can be completed, tested, and implemented.
Harrison proposes a new overlay architecture called edge-to-edge traffic control [12]. 
It would involve spreading congestion across edge nodes to allow break up of congestion 
at interior nodes. This is achieved by establishing control loops (virtual links) that 
operate between domain edges to regulate the aggregate traffic between each edge pair. 
Control packets are exchanged between edge-to-edge nodes through the virtual link. This 
research does not appear to be complete as far as an Internet wide implementation. It is 
therefore not proven that it would be effective in preventing DoS attacks.
Aura proposes an authentication protocol based on client puzzles [2]. The concept 
here is to present the client with a puzzle (e.g. a brute-force reversal of a one-way hash 
function) as part of an authentication protocol to cause the client to commit resources 
prior to the server allocating its own resources. This would effectively prevent DoS by 
causing the client to utilize more resources than the server during the initial conversation.
Savage suggests a packet marking mechanism which would facilitate tracing attacks 
back to their source [24,25]. This has limited usefulness in preventing DoS since it is 
primarily an “after-the-fact” technique and attackers have many ways of hiding their true 
identity.
Moore proposes an active packet design in which packets carry actual programs 
rather than the standard headers [20,21]. The programs in the packets are then used to 
control more powerful node-resident services. This is not a new concept. Previous active 
packet designs have been used in applications such as reliable multicast and application 
directed routing. Moore suggests his active packet design (SNAP: Safe and Nimble
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Active Packets) is more practical in terms of safety and efficiency. It uses a special- 
purpose interpreted language based on a virtual machine. This technique could be used 
to prevent DoS through a “surveyor” program that would visit a series of nodes and query 
the traffic load. The program carries a list of nodes to query and visits each in sequence. 
At each node, it queries the local traffic load and keeps a running sum. The sum could 
then be used to project bandwidth requirements. The entire program only uses 80 bytes 
of code (20 instructions).
Traffic Analysis Methods 
There is a recent paper that focuses specifically on methods for detecting and 
containing worm infections [18]. It proposes identifying and blocking traffic from 
infected hosts (address blacklisting) and dropping packets that match a worm database of 
content signatures (content filtering). This method is dependent on a reaction time for 
detection, information propagation, and containment strategy activation. It correctly 
predicts (the paper predates the introduction of the Slammer worm) that future worms 
will include “aggressive worms that cannot be effectively contained” using this approach.
Gil proposes a new data structure for routers called MUlti-Level Tree for Online 
Packet Statistics (MULTOPS) [11]. The data structure is kept in a tree that dynamically 
changes its shape to reflect changes in packet rates. Bandwidth attacks are detected by 
searching for asymmetries between packet rates to and from different subnets. This 
approach could be effective in detecting UDP and ICMP based attacks but cannot reliably 
detect TCP based attacks (because TCP is an adaptive protocol).
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A research project being funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
is called COSSACK (Coordinated Suppression of Simultaneous Attacks) [16]. This 
project will set up dedicated computers to continuously monitor the Internet, looking for 
signs of an attaek. When an attack is detected, they will filter out the attack packets and 
send a notification message. The results of this project will not be available until at least 
2004.
Martinez proposes a network security method, which is designed to protect the 
system being attacked [17]. The method is based on an Emergency Pulse Packet (EPP) 
System that consists of an intrusion detection system that uses analytical agents and an IP 
address communicator that sends information to a firewall to block the source of the 
attack. It consists of four components: an Intrusion Detection System that discovers and 
logs any unauthorized use of resources, an Analysis agent that scans the alert file and 
identifies event signatures, a Send Packet agent that sends source and destination 
addresses to the Deny agent, and a Deny agent that configures the firewall with a new 
rule. This approach relies on signatures of known attacks or classes of attacks for 
detection.
Ramanathan proposes a DoS detection mechanism based on wavelet signatures [23]. 
He calls this method WADeS (Wavelet based Attack Detection Signatures). He separates 
traffic into short-term and long-term flows with a certain portion classified as miss traffic 
(traffic for which the packet count does not exceed a certain threshold). He then 
computes a wavelet transform over the miss traffic and correlates it over long-term time- 
scales. Differences in wavelet signatures indicate a DoS attack.
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Ye proposes an Anti-Flooding Flow-Control (AFFC) model for detecting and 
controlling flooding type DoS attacks [33]. This model includes traffic classification, 
dynamic buffer management, packet scheduling, and early-traffic-regulation (ETR). Her 
centralized bandwidth usage analysis is complicated by the diversity of the Internet, its 
growth over time including growth of different types of traffic, and the variance in usage 
over time of day and day of the week.
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CHAPTER 4
PROPOSED APPROACH FOR PREVENTING DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
It is a well-known fact that the Internet is growing at an ever-increasing rate. Not 
only is it becoming a part of everyday life for the majority of people, it has become a 
vital factor in the functioning of society as a whole. Many companies and governmental 
bodies rely on the Internet for communication (IP telephony as well as email) and supply 
chain management. With the popularity of just-in-time inventory management, an 
interruption of the supply chain would cause manufacturers, distributors, and many 
retailers to be unable to continue operation in a matter of a few days. This could cascade 
into a loss of public transportation, emergency services, and health care. Not long 
thereafter, individuals would begin to run out of food and fuel. According to the co- 
chairman of the president’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, the flow of 
electricity and natural gas is susceptible to cyberattack [31]. The potential effect of either 
a targeted or widespread attack on the Internet is frightening.
According to Symantec Corporation, a leading Internet security firm, the number of 
cyber attacks on corporate networks rose 20 percent in the second half of 2002 and the 
number of reported network vulnerabilities nearly doubled from a year earlier [7]. It no 
longer requires a high degree of skill to initiate a cyber attack. The operating system and 
other software developers publish a full description of attack vulnerabilities on their web 
sites. Easy to use software tools to automate cyber attacks are described in books [8] and
15
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made available for download on innumerable web sites. More and more private 
individuals are using DSL and cable modem Internet connections. The combination of a 
high-bandwidth, “always-on” connection in use by an individual who is usually unaware 
of network security requirements makes these systems an easy target for compromise as 
zombies or other attack vehicles. The growing popularity of Windows XP for home 
systems, which has been designed to provide full raw socket support (as opposed to 
Windows 9x), makes packet crafting readily available.
It is a well-known fact that the initial design of the Internet was not done with 
security in mind. Some of the proposed protocols outlined in Chapter 3 [20,21,24,25] 
involve a change in the packet structure to enhance security. There are a number of 
active Internet design projects such as Intemet2 [13], Next Generation Internet [30], and 
Large Scale Networking Coordinating Group [29]. A complete or partial redesign of 
Internet architecture could eliminate or mitigate the security deficiencies in the long term 
but it does nothing to solve the immediate DoS vulnerabilities
Other proposed protocols rely on an overlay architecture [2,12]. Overlay 
architectures depend upon the cooperation of all participants, including the attackers.
This is an unrealistic assumption.
Many of the proposed traffic analysis methods discussed in Chapter 3 rely on content 
signatures of known attacks. Since new attacks are constantly being introduced, there is 
an unacceptable time delay in identifying and implementing new signatures.
Other methods [11,23,33] use relatively sophisticated analysis techniques. The 
dynamic nature of the Internet and the diversity and geographic dispersion of its users 
would require that any analysis and control technique be capable of being adjusted as
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needed. This adjusting would be done by network personnel who are not necessarily 
Computer Scientists (e.g. they may not understand wavelet theory). A simpler approach 
would be more effective.
All bandwidth consumption attacks have one thing in common. They have to use a 
protocol at the Transport or Internet layer (referencing the TCP networking model) that is 
routable across the Internet. This is limited to three: TCP, UDP, and ICMP. If the entry 
flow rate of these packet types is appropriately limited at the edges of the Internet, 
bandwidth consumption attacks could be controlled. If this were coupled with source IP 
address verification (Ingress Filtering) at the same time, source IP address spoofing 
would be virtually eliminated (at least confined to known subnets) and attackers could be 
more easily identified.
A relatively immediate solution would be to mandate by law that ^  Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) institute router controls that are already available. This would include 
Ingress Filtering and Rate Limiting.
Ingress Filtering is implemented by configuring the ISP edge router to only accept 
traffic with source addresses belonging to the customer network [5]. On a Cisco router, 
for example, this is done by applying an Access Control List on the incoming interface: 
access-list 100 permit ip {customer network} {customer network mask} any 
access-list 100 deny ip any any [log] 
interface {ingress interface} 
ip access-group 100 in 
This process can be made more efficient by enabling Reverse Path Forwarding on the 
incoming interface:
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ip verify unicast reverse-path 
Reverse Path Forwarding requires that Cisco Express Forwarding be enabled on the 
router.
Rate Limiting would be used to limit the total amount of bandwidth that could be 
used by a particular packet type. Studies have shown (although confined to host based 
techniques) that rate limiting can be effective in restricting attack propagation [32]. 
Again, using a Cisco router as an example, limits could be placed using a Committed 
Access Rate (which requires Cisco Express Forwarding). For ICMP: 
interface {ingress interface}
rate-limit input access-group 101 3000000 512000 786000 conform-action 
transmit exceed-action drop 
access-list 101 permit icmp any any 
where 3000000 is the average bps, 512000 is the normal burst (in bytes), and 786000 is 
the excess burst (in bytes).
To configure rate limiting for SYN packets: 
interface {ingress interface}
rate-limit input access-group 103 45000000 100000 100000 conform-action 
transmit exceed-action drop 
rate-limit input access-group 102 1000000 100000 100000 conform-action 
transmit exceed-action drop 
access-list 102 permit tcp any any 
access-list 103 permit tcp any any established
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where average bps and bursts are defined as above. The 103 Access Control List will 
permit any established TCP traffic (packets with either the ACK or RST bit set) to be sent 
at a higher rate. Any TCP traffic with just the SYN bit set (connection attempts) will be 
limited to the lower rate. If this rate limit is being exceeded, obviously the host is not 
pausing to wait for acknowledgements and this is a possible attack.
For UDP traffic:
interface {ingress interface}
rate-limit input access-group 104 1000000 100000 100000 conform-action 
transmit exceed-action drop 
access-list 104 permit udp any any 
The actual values for average bps and bursts would have to be set very carefully to avoid 
dropping legitimate traffic and would depend on customer type, speed of the connection, 
etc.
International access points could be ordered blocked in the face of an attack to protect 
United States infrastructure.
This is only a partial solution but it would be an immediate one. ISPs have obviously 
been unwilling to do this voluntarily. Security experts have recommended (as input to 
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace being prepared by the cybersecurity panel 
headed by President Bush’s computer security advisor) that more responsibility be put on 
Internet providers to screen data traffic for attacks. ISP objections were so strong that 
this recommendation was omitted from the draft report released in September 2002. One 
ISP executive claimed that their concern was “security tends to slow down data 
transmission” [6]. Other reasons might be the amount of effort involved and the potential
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claim of legal liability in the event of a subsequent successful DoS attack. Many 
individuals (including a computer crime attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice) seem 
to think that ISPs will soon be held liable for DoS attacks whether or not there is a law 
enacted that gives them primary prevention responsibility [14,22].
Effort should begin to develop appliances that limit protocols by packet type count 
per unit of time. These would simplify the administration of rate limits and would be 
independent of a specific router type or brand. Limits could vary by client type and 
specific authorization. Ingress filtering would still be required.
These appliances could be made very fast by implementing most of the rate limiting 
process in hardware rather than software. They could use Application Specific Integrated 
Circuits (ASICs) similar to current multilayer switching technology. There are already 
similar devices on the market for use primarily on the customer side but they are too 
generalized (and too expensive) [1,3,32,].
It would be difficult to use a packet count approach at international access points and 
that may require the use of a more sophisticated technique similar to those described in 
Chapter 3. We may be restricted in the ability to prevent the introduction of an attack 
from outside the United States but ingress filtering and packet count limitations, as 
described above, would control its spread and effect within the United States. We could 
still retain the option of blocking international access points to protect U.S. infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has given an overview of the different types of Denial of Service attacks.
It has demonstrated the potential danger represented by these vulnerabilities and has 
shown that none of the detection and prevention mechanisms that have been discussed in 
recent literature would give adequate protection. The recent demonstration of attack 
methods with extremely fast propagation times and wide-reaching negative effects 
demands that action be taken now.
The simplified approach for DoS prevention proposed in Chapter 4 has excellent 
potential but there are some possible limitations that would require further study:
- DDoS UDP attacks may still be successful. If a very large number of zombies 
were used, each with a relatively low rate of UDP packets, this could circumvent 
the edge node rate limiting controls. This circumstance might require some sort 
of centralized rate limiting.
TCP ACK attacks would not be limited by using the standard router configuration 
commands. This could be addressed by the customized appliance proposed as a 
long-term solution.
SMTP could still be a problem, in spite of its sender/receiver dialogue 
requirements, since it is possible to send multiple messages during a single TCP 
connection. This is of particular concern since it is known that some worms
21
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include an SMTP server capability. This could also be addressed by the 
customized appliance.
The current situation with the Internet can be compared to safety standards for the 
auto industry (although automobiles have never been nearly as critical to our 
infrastructure as the Internet has become). Although the safety vulnerabilities and the 
danger to the public were demonstrated in numerous ways, the auto industry declined to 
make any safety related design changes until mandated by Federal law. Since the various 
auto safety standards have been enacted, the public is much safer and the auto industry 
has suffered no ill effects.
The time for action is now. Although the Internet was designed in a much safer 
environment when the only damage its interruption could do was delay some research 
projects, it has grown into something much more dangerous. The implementation of the 
solutions proposed in Chapter 4 of this thesis could prevent this danger from becoming a 
reality.
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